Susan Petrilli

Migration, an Inescapable Demand
The Responsibility of Hosting and the Right to Hospitality

Abstract
This essay investigates the problem of “citizenship” with special reference to the signs of European identity. The concept of “citizenship” is connected with “nation” and is generally understood in terms of “identity-difference.” Citizenship is also connected with “community,” in this case “European Community.” “Community” is normally invested with a restrictive meaning based on “identity,” closed identity. This makes for a closed community rather than an open community, “open society” (Charles Morris). Moreover, community is generally understood as a “work community,” where hospitality is subordinate to employment, no differently from the Nazi Gemeinschaft (community) where even Jews were safe if provided with a work certificate (Schindler’s List, by Steven Spielberg). As foreseen by Umberto Eco in the early 1990s, “migration” is a major problem, if not the major problem, for the European Union in today’s world. This problem is connected with the relation between “identity” and “alterity.” Eco was among the first to distinguish clearly between “migration” and traditional “emigration/immigration.” Unlike “emigration,” “migration” appeals to “unconditional welcome,” to “hospitality” toward the other more than to accords and international exchanges. “Migration” interrogates “human rights,” putting the dominant interpretation thereof into crisis: as denounced by Emmanuel Levinas, “human rights” are most often reduced to the “rights of identity” from which the “rights of the other” are excluded. But the whole question of European citizenship, which is the problem of European identity, of identity tout court calls for social planning that is not subservient to the “ideo-logic” of profit, self-interest, productivity, functionality. The task of social planning, therefore of proposing viable social programs is urgent for the sake of a healthy European Union in terms of the properly human. The question of citizenship is crucially important for global humanity, in Europe, the United States of America, for national identity over the globe, and calls for the expertise of semioticians, in particular practitioners of “global semiotics” oriented in the sense of semioethics. The human being is a “semiotic animal” endowed with “semiosis” like all other life-forms, but uniquely also with “metasemiosis,” a capacity for reflection on signs, and for deliberation. As a “semiotic animal” and not only “semiotic animal,” the human is the only living being capable of responsibility. Responsibility is not abstract, but concerns life over the planet and must respond to the other’s demand, to the other simply for existing, to the other as presence, singularity, as a unique I, self. The question of identity is the question of alterity; the question of citizenship is the question of how to respond to the other and for the other, how to account to the other and for the other. These and related topics are at the centre of the present essay, which is developed around the following headings: 1. Citizenship, nation, migration; 2. Open identity, global communication and responsibility; 3. Contradictions, mystifications and paradoxes – juridical, political and ethical; 4. Listening as an unconditional condition; 5. Beyond reason: reasonableness; 6. Identity and alterity in Europe; 7. The European Constitution: a real entity or and illusion?; 8. Justice, migration, citizenship; 9. Identity and Identities; 10. Searching for ways out – out-of-identity, out-of-place; 11. Otherwise than the being of things as they are; 12. Global semiotics, global citizenship.
Keywords: alterity, citizenship, community, difference, hospitality, human rights, global semiotics, identity, metasemiosis, migration, open self, semioethics.

"Peregrino, quasi mendicando, sono andato, mostrando contra mia voglia la piaga de la fortuna, che suole ingiustamente al piagato molte volte essere imputata."

(Dante Alighieri, Convivio 1, iii, 3)

1. Citizenship, nation, migration

The problem of citizenship is examined in this essay in a global semiotic perspective keeping account of the European Constitution, formally Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, approved by the Intergovernmental conference dated 18 June 2004. The concept of “citizenship” is connected to “Nation,” therefore with a conception of “sovereignty.” “Citizenship,” “nation” and “sovereignty” are generally understood in terms of identity. Moreover, “citizenship” is associated with the concept of “community” understood as “open community,” “intercommunity,” but also with the concepts of “frontier” and “border,” therefore with the “closed community.”

Signs are used by nations and cultures to distinguish identities and differences essentially in two ways, at least:

1) either – and this is the most common case – to establish differences with respect to other nations and other cultures, that is, to define identity and juxtapose it to other identities, other differences, “identity differences.” These are normally in relations of mutual indifference to each other, in the best of cases in relations involving such terms as the “tolerant / tolerating” and the “tolerated,” being relations that very easily degenerate into conflict and war. The signs of identity thus described are pre-fixed, pre-constituted and pre-defined even prejudicially, they most often involve stereotypes and are prone to forms of abjection;

2) or, desirable but less common, signs can be used by nations and cultures to respond to signs of other nations and cultures in a cultural climate of transnationalism, in relations of the dialogical order, oriented by such values as hospitality, care and mutual involvement, by the will to participative unindifference to the other, in the relation among differences unindifferent to each other. In this case, signs are characterized by interrogative intonation, listening and responsive understanding. Signs question other signs which interrogate other signs in a sort of unending dialogue.

Signs used to fix and juxtapose identities, what we recognize as “closed identities,” tend to prevail yet again in the presentday world over signs that, instead, diversify, calling for ongoing renewal, recreation, innovation. These are signs connected with encounter and dialogue, with relations of mutual influence and hospitality among different cultures, languages and lifestyles. Such signs are oriented by the logic of alterity in the relation between I and other and between I and self, where the word “alterity” evokes the existence of something on its own account, autonomously, independently of

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the I’s initiative, of volition, of consciousness, of wilful recognition, as such a synonym for materiality understood as objectivity.⁴

We are concerned here with the relation between signs and identity with particular reference to national identity, which inevitably involves the question of citizenship. Analysis with any claims to adequacy of national identity, identity of the Nation-State, and of citizenship connected to formation of the Nation-State must keep account of the sign structure of identity.⁵ Of course, the same holds true for the special problem of ethnic identity, ethnic difference, this too established through signs. Without signs identity, difference is not possible. From our point of view then, while we recognise the need for an understanding of these issues in a sociological and politological key, our perspective is of the semiotical order, oriented in the sense of semiotics.⁶

The conception of nation is a historical product, appearing with the rise of national monarchies in Europe toward the end of the Middle Ages. Subsequently, from the French revolution onward, the idea of Nation was related to citizenship and the citizen’s rights. As a historical product, the concept of Nation begins at a given point in history, then to develop thereafter. Obviously, Nation is here understood in the modern sense, that is, relatedly to the State, to the formation of the Nation-State.

The expression “citizen” indicates the condition of undifferentiated belonging to the Nation, hence the possibility of accessing the same rights. The citizen is an equal among equals: “equality,” “fraternity” and “freedom” are prerogatives of belonging to the Nation. Furthermore, the idea of Nation as a national State is associated with the idea of territory. This connection too is of the historical order. Generally, the borders and boundaries of a national State, the territory it covers, are established historically. Moreover, the most common pathway to defining territory, thus the right to belong to a given territory is, and always has been, conflict, war, inevitably violation, on one side or on the other, of “human rights” – though above all on the other; it is always the other who is accused of being the cause, both remote and current, the other’s fault.⁷

Another meaning of the word “Nation” can be traced back to the ancient world and generally indicates what the Romans called gens. A derivation thereof is the concept of “national minorities” within the Nation-State, of different “Nations” in the sense of different peoples belonging to the same Nation-State.

Again, at the time of British colonisation of “Australia” the indigenous peoples of that land were classified into approximately 600-700 Nations (so-called “First Nations”), each with a specific name and in most cases with a specific language. Today this multiplicity of “Nations” no longer exists to the extent that they have been mostly destroyed through a long and silent process of genocide practiced over the centuries, in the name of Western civilization and defence of its identity self-interests⁸.

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⁴ Petrilli (2005a, 2010).
⁷ Catone and Ponzi 2005.
Given its association with a specific historical situation, the conception of Nation has changed with transformations in the historical situation that originally produced it. However, ideas often persist and continue influencing historical developments in the form of ideology. The idea of Nation is no exception: it does not simply respond to historical reality, as a consequence thereof, but to the extent that it is ideological and not only a conceptual abstraction, it acts on history, shaping the course of events. Analogously to all social institutions that coexist and form an important part of social life and that derive from past economic, social and cultural systems, the concept of nation develops as a historical product incorporating stereotypes and ideologies which too are inherited from the past.9 “Nation” as it is understood today, with its physiognomy, rules and regulations, is subject to the same type of development. The idea of nation is associated with identity understood in ethnic, linguistic and religious terms. And again, it is connected with the concept of territory, frontiers and territorial borders. Such ideas continue influencing present day reality in spite of historical transformations in terms of globalisation, where the expression “globalisation” indicates a relatively new historical condition of the socio-economical and political orders, connected with the “global village,” in fact how under attack with the current war on global trade, particularly the tariff war with China and USA as main actors.

The concept of “global village” does not have a correlate in the idea of “global citizenship,” nor is this a surprise if we consider that like all concrete abstractions in social reproduction, the “global village” is dominated by identity logic, closed identity, paradoxically therefore by the idio-logic of walls and barriers, closures and security conceived in terms of defence from intrusion by the other, today from the invasion of migrants.

In addition to the phenomenon of globalisation, the modern world is witness at one and the same time to processes of deterritorialisation and denationalisation all over the globe. The trends involved are so broad as to involve encounter among different peoples, languages and cultures, most often caused to merge, whether they like it or not. Allusion here is above all to the migratory fluxes currently sweeping across the globe, new forms of nomadism, originating from territories where the level of survival for various reasons is scarce, even nonexistent. Migration from the African continent, ex-socialist countries, the Middle East to Europe, from every corner of the world to Canada, from Latin America to the United States, from Asia to Australia, and so forth cannot be restrained, if not as an illusion with pretexts of the vulgar populist order in defence of Nation-State borders. The destruction of life-forms and social organisation is imputable to the spread of capitalism with its traditional forms of imperialism and exploitation, poverty, overpopulation and unemployment in certain areas of the world, but also to so-called “natural” disasters, as well as to “military intervention,” to war now most often justified as “humanitarian.” All this together makes for virtually impossible survival to any degree of human dignity, sustainability.10

The migration phenomenon is closely connected to the relation between development and underdevelopment: development produces underdevelopment and consequently it provokes mass migratory fluxes from territories where survival is impossible, toward territories belonging to the so-called “developed” world. We are witnesses in the present day and age to epochal upheavals and transformations between shifting peoples across the globe, uprooted from their national territory, from national citizenship, from ethnic group, on the one hand, and defence of national identity, national security which integrated citizens consider under threat from migrating extracommunitarians, on the

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other. So-called developed countries are engaged in obstructing migratory fluxes in defence of their land and acquired rights. In fact developed countries resort to the idea of Nation and national identity to distinguish between “communitarians” and “extracomunitarians,” between those who belong to a given Nation, to a given community, and those who do not, between those who have a right to the rights of citizenship, who enjoy the rights of citizenship and those who are denied citizenship, not to mention human rights tout court.\footnote{Ponzio (2013), 23-24.}

With reference to the European Union, therefore to the formation of a new supranational political community, the concept of citizenship today calls for revisitation keeping account of the phenomenon of “migration” (now occurring in apocalyptic proportions all over the globe) and of the “request for hospitality” which comes with it, and which cannot be escaped. Precisely the phenomenon of migration as it looms worldwide, not only internally to Europe but also externally, evidences the need for dialogical, detotalising, critical thinking, at a global level à propos the egocentrism of shortsighted, separatist worldviews tending to confirmation of the same, the identical, inspired by delusory ethnocentric, anthropocentric and eurocentric fantasies.\footnote{See Petrilli (2014b).}

In his presentation on “Migrations in the Third Millenium,” pronounced in Valenčia, in January 1997, at a conference dedicated to perspectives on the Third Millenium, Umberto Eco, citing the statute of the Académie Universelle des Cultures, founded in Paris in the 1990s, undersigns the statement that migration produces a great “métissage of cultures,” foreseeing the inevitability of this type of development continuing in the future. This text by Eco is now included with another three in the booklet, Migrazione e Intolleranza, published posthumously in 2019.\footnote{In addition to “Migrations in the Third Millenium” (“Le migrazioni del Terzo Millenio”), this booklet by Eco, Migrazione e intolleranza, includes “Intolerance” (“Intolleranza”), the readaptation of a conference held at the International Forum on intolerance organized in Paris at the Académie Universelle des Cultures, in 1997; “A new Nimega treaty” (“Un nuovo trattato di Nimega”), the first European peace treaty was signed in Nimega in 1678, taken from an inaugural address held at the University of Nijmegen, Holland, in 2012; and, finally, the introduction to an anthology, “Experiences of mutual anthropolgy” (“Esperienze di antropologia reciproca”), produced by the association Transculture, Paris (2011). The latter two texts were previously unpublished in Italy, thus appearing in this booklet in Italian for the first time.} In it he claims that “we must prepare ourselves for the fact that Europe in the next millennium will be like New York or certain countries in Latin America.”\footnote{Eco (2019), 20, my trans.} And after having described encounter among cultures and the forms it takes in the USA as well as in Latin America, Eco continues repeating that “what awaits Europe is the same sort of phenomenon,” that is, a métissage of cultures, convinced that “no racist, no reactionary nostalgic can stop it.”\footnote{Ibid., 21, my trans.} Eco distinguishes between the concept of “migration” and of “immigration.” In the first case, migration involves phenomena that can be controlled politically; in the second, migrations, whether violent or peaceful, are like natural phenomena that cannot be controlled. Moreover, regarding the cultural question, with “immigration” processes of integration prevail and immigrants tend to adapt to the customs of the host country; instead, with “migration,” a phenomenon that nobody can stop at the borders, the tendency is to transform the host culture. The phenomenon that has been dominating for decades now is that of mobility of peoples over the whole planet, in apocalyptic dimensions, with the characteristics of migration, even if, as Eco says, in certain cases it is
difficult to establish whether we are effectively dealing with “immigration” or with “migration.” And nonetheless Umberto Eco is convinced that

The phenomena that Europe is still trying to deal with as cases of immigration are instead cases of migration. The Third World is knocking on Europe’s doors, and enters even if Europe doesn’t agree. The problem is no longer to decide (as the politicians pretend to believe) whether students wearing the chador should be admitted to Paris, or how many mosques should be built in Rome. The problem is that in the next millennium (and given that I’m not a prophet I can’t specify the exact date), Europe will be a multiracial, or, if you prefer, “coloured” continent. If you like it, this is how things will stand; and if you don’t like it, this is how things will stand all the same.16

2. Open identity, global communication and responsibility

“Citizenship,” like “community” to which citizenship refers, is commonly conceived in terms of “identity,” more precisely identity-difference, and identity in turn is generally conceived as closed identity. Thus understood identity implies well-defined borders that serve to exclude the other, to the end of limiting responsibility toward the other.

Identity tends to deny singularity and to assert itself in its generality. Insofar as it converges with the totality, the closed monological totality, identity and difference reduced to identity (identity-difference, precisely) are achieved through elimination of difference understood as alterity, otherness (alterity-difference). Thus delineated identity is egocentric and shortsighted, indifferent to the other, to alterity-difference, to identity open to otherness.

A characteristic orientation of dominant community “ideo-logic” (ideology so radically embedded in reality as to appear as its inevitable logic)17 when a question of the community conceived in terms of “closed identity” is indifference to the other at the very least, if not the tendency to exclude the other who does not belong to the community, who does not partake in community identity, to outright expunction. The so-called “extracommunitarian” is generally perceived as not having any justification whatsoever for intrusiveness, interference, for what is considered as an act of “invasion.” Extracommunitarians are generally forced to live undercover, as illegals, in Italian “clandestino” – among possible dictionary translations into English this term, “clandestine,” is also rendered with the word “black.”

Based on arguments concerning identity, ex-Jugoslavia was partitioned and Kosovo’s independence from Serbia achieved through war, violence and death was justified by NATO as a case of “humanitarian intervention,” in truth armed intervention, with bombings on Belgrade supported by Italy, in violation of international law.18

“Humanitarian intervention” was a preamble to what was to become a succession of “humanitarian wars.” The 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (with the participation of all States that counted at the time, including Soviet Union and USA) asserted the principle of no justification for war, whether a question of participating or non-participating States. Contrary to this position, in 1991 the possibility of “just and necessary war,” “humanitarian war,” “preventive war,”

16 Ibid., 26, my trans.
17 Petrilli (2004a).
“war against war” was conceived, practiced and imposed. This event was followed in 2002 by the White House document, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, which lists a series of “Scoundrel States” so considered in terms of security. This document legitimates war as a pathway to security, at last proclaiming the need for “infinite war”!  

Concerning the conception of identity, an important distinction was introduced and formalized by Charles Morris in his monograph, *The Open Self* (1948), between open identity and closed identity, open self and closed self, open community and closed community. “Community” is generally understood in a restrictive, identity sense. Rather than in terms of “open community,” “open society,” “community” is normally considered as a “closed community,” and as evidenced by the question of citizenship the European community is no exception. The European community is a *labour community* such that admission of migrants is subordinate to employment, no differently from Nazi Germany where the concept of *Gesellschaft* (society) was replaced by *Gemeinschaft* (community) in which even Jews if in possession of a work certificate were safe from the crematoria, as commemorated by Steven Spielberg in the film, *Schindler’s List*.

With reference to the totality, to the closed community, identity-difference is achieved on the basis of the logic of opposition, binary opposition, hence of conflictual relations. This type of relation is defined by Charles S. Peirce as “obsistent” a question of relations that request opposition as a necessary condition, given that to eliminate opposition means to eliminate identity (cf. Peirce, *CP* 2.91-2.96). Insofar as it is founded on closed identity, difference in the best of cases will tolerate the other, the opposite other, thus defined with reference to such factors as ethnicity, culture, language, skin colour, gender, religion, nation, role, social class, etc.

As observed by Pier Paolo Pasolini in his “little pedagogical treaty” *Genariello* (written in 1975), the verb “to tolerate” as a present participle – in Italian “tollerante,” in English “tolerating” / “tolerant” – denotes a highly commendable, praiseworthy attitude. But if somebody is tolerating / tolerant, somebody else is tolerated. The verb to tolerate as a past participle, tolerated, indicates a condition that can hardly please anybody: “I am tolerated, like a negro in a white racist society. How truly humane of those who tolerate me.” The real meaning of the word “tolerance” and the verb “to tolerate” is effectively perceived through the past participle. Tolerance, as Pasolini says, “is purely nominal.” “Real tolerance” is a contradiction in terms. Tolerance is a refined from of condemnation. And to the extent that tolerance implies a relation among oppositional identities, its degeneration into open conflict is an ongoing and threatening possibility.

Today, assertion of the closed community occurs in a precise politico-economic context, the “global market.” Here, all communication programs belong to one logic, to one “ideo-logic,” that is, the “ideo-logic” of capital to one social plan which converges with the development plan of the so-called capitalist system, keeping account of the differences, no doubt, but generally only nominal, only differences in “name.” Important to underline is the role carried out in this system by communication and its totalising orientation, at the service of a dominant, univocal, monological worldview (cf. Petrilli 2008, 2010).

In reality globalisation is the globalisation of conflict, of national and multinational self-interests. This trend is connected with competition on the market, apparently an open market without

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19 See Cataldo, Veljovic, Ciric (2003); Catone & Ponzio (2005); Catone & Martocchia (2018).
20 Pasolini (1976), 23.
boundaries, but in truth with a constitutive hostility which can easily degenerate from the defence of national borders – with walls, whether ideal or physical – into armed conflict.

Difference based on closed identity leads to worlds founded on separation and dominion, on relations organised in hierarchies among identity-differences, armoured differences, indifferent to alterity-differences. This type of logic supports what we may call the “globalisation of indifference,” inevitably involving the need to defend identity-difference self-interest, to the point even of admitting the extrema ratio of war, of expunging the other at the cost of life.

“Indifference,” as stated by Antonio Gramsci in a text of 1912, “operates powerfully in history. It operates passively, but it operates. This is fatality.” Contrary to an attitude of indifference, the citizen is called to participate actively in civil life, to take a stand and assume one’s responsibilities: “There is no such thing as only men, strangers to the city. Whomever really lives cannot not be a citizen, and take sides. Indifference is abulia, parassitism, cowardice, it is not life. This is why I hate the indifferent” (Ibid.).

In the current phase of capitalist development, dominion is achieved through control over communication channels (e.g. oil pipelines), consequently over production and mercantile exchange relations. With Ferruccio Rossi-Landi the claim is that the dominant class is the class that owns capital, but the expression “capital” is now also specified in terms of control over communication. If the “arcane” in exchange of commodities is in exchange among human individuals, today in the capitalist system more than ever before production is communication. Globalisation is the globalisation of “communication-production,” where communication is not only the intermediary phase in the production cycle (production, communication, consumption), but also invests the production phase as much as the consumption phase: communication is clearly present throughout all three phases in the productive cycle.

Dominant ideology imposes and reproduces itself automatically, without encountering opposition. To the monologic of communication there corresponds the monolingualism of verbal and nonverbal languages: when a question of the verbal, reference is to both historic-natural language (Fr. langue; It. lingua) – as in the case of linguistic imperialism of the English language in a globalised world –, and to languages (Fr. langue; It. linguaggio) internal to a given historic-natural language (Fr. langue; It. lingua); in the case of the nonverbal, reference is to homologation of human behaviour insofar as it is sign behaviour, of needs and desires, etc. Today dominant communication is characterised by a new form of Orwellian “Newspeak,” independently of the language in which it is expressed, hence independently of domination by the English language.

In sign terms, all this presupposes the inclination not to recognise alterity, the other, difference, alterity-difference, but to eliminate alterity in the relation between signs, between interpretant sign and interpreted sign, and to favour instead processes of identification where interpretation concludes with negation of the other and confirmation of the same. All this translates into reducing communication in the global human community to the defence of Identity, to reproduction of the Same, Reality, Being. Identity is the dominant category in Western thought and practice today. The fundamental concrete abstractions that form the reality of everyday experience – including World, History, Subject, Individual, Community, Difference, Truth, Reason, Freedom, Force, Power, Politics, Work,

22 Gramsci (2016: 3).
24 Petrilli & Ponzio (2005), 491-532.
Productivity, Market – are constructed on the logic of closed identity and structure the global social reproduction system. Thus shaped social relations are organised into closed systems, closed communities ready to expel whoever does not belong to the community, the extracommunitarian.

3. Contradictions, mystifications and paradoxes – juridical, political and ethical

Paradoxically, with the worldwide spread of the market, accompanied by communication, or better, communication-production tending to monologism, a social order is installed, as foreseen by Charles Morris in The Open Self, that tends toward closed identity, a repressive order ready to reject and expel the other. And as we know repression creates neurosis.

Under the banner of “democracy” a cultural regime of the fascist order, unitary, totalitarian, tyrannical and monological is asserted silently and without significant resistance, without a real opening to critique and conscious awareness. In this monograph, among the expressions used by Morris to qualify an “open society,” the word “democracy” does not appear. As a semiotician, like Victoria Lady Welby before him (with her “significs”), Morris paid careful attention to the meaning of words and was mindful of the mystifying effects deriving from their misuse and abuse. He offers the following explanation for his decision not to use the expression “democracy” to qualify an “open society”:

We have not used the term “democracy.” The avoidance was deliberate. For all sweet words are soured by misuse. “Democracy” has become a strongly appraisive term, designatively unclear. To call oneself democratic is now as unrevealing and as inevitable, as for politicians to be photographed with babies. We have been told by one who ought to know that when fascism conquers America it will do so in the name of democracy. In fact, whatever is now done in America – or elsewhere on the earth – will be done in the name of democracy. So we need to talk concretely. None of the grandiose labels we bandy about is of much value today. The actual problems of the contemporary world are not helped by invoking such overworked words as “individualism,” “socialism,” “capitalism,” “liberalism,” “communism,” “fascism,” “democracy.” These terms are loaded appraisals. Each culture and each group, will use them to its own advantage. If we were to use the term “democracy” designatively it would be synonymous with the phrase “open society of open selves.” But since we have this more exact phrase and since no labels are sacred or indispensable, we can dispense with the word “democracy.”

In a text of 1995 Umberto Eco, also alerts us against the mystifications of “democracy,” drawing our attention to what he calls “eternal fascism” or “urfascism.” He lists fourteen characteristics thereof, with the warning that these characteristics “cannot be regimented into a system; many are mutually contradictory, and are typical of other forms of despotism or fanaticism. But it will suffice for one of them to be present for a fascist nebula to coagulate.” Among the characteristics of fascist culture described by Eco here let me evidence: the cult of tradition, refusal of contradictions and critique, ensuing lack of progress in knowledge; fear of difference, of the other, refusal of intruders; the conception of life as permanent war; contempt of the poor; machismo; recourse to “neo-language,” an

26 Petrilli (2014a), 139-157; (2016a), 279-306.
27 Ibid., 155–156.
29 Ibid., 33.
impoeverished language in terms of lexicon and syntax to the end of obstructing complex, critical and creative thought as prefigured by Orwell in Nineteen Eight-Four with his Newspeak, spoken today, even if unconsciously, in popular television “talk-shows,” but in truth by all global languages through our worldwide social networks; and, lastly, “qualitative populism,” today “TV or internet qualitative populism,” wherewith a leader speaks for his people and acts in their name: “each time a politician casts doubt on the legitimacy of parliament because it no longer represents ‘the voice of the people’ we perceive the smell of Ur-fascism.”

In Voyous Jacques Derrida too underlines the mystifying character of the concept of “democracy,” referred to as “current, present democracy,” “our democracy,” observing that “la démocratie [est] à venir: il faut que ça donne le temps qu’il n’y a pas.”

In the preamble to the Constitution for Europe, the claim is that inspiration is drawn from the universal values of human rights – liberty, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. These are the same values that inspire The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, but with the difference that in the latter case reference to neoliberal economy is explicit. In the “Introduction,” in fact, George W. Bush associates the expressions “freedom” and “democracy” to “free enterprise”: “freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”

In contrast to what we are led to glimpse from the epigraph in the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (proposed for consensus by the EU-convention 13 June and 10 July 2003), cited from Thucydides (11, 37, and removed from the final version of the constitution), who reports Pericles’ funeral oration: “Our Constitution [...] is called a Democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority,” the exercise of democracy is by no means a question of quantity, of numbers. If the aim is to guarantee fundamental human rights, comprehensive of the rights of the other, as claims Emmanuel Levinas, freedom, security, justice, etc., and not only my rights, the rights of identity, an essential condition is the capacity for listening, listening to the many voices, with Mikhail Bakhtin the capacity for responsibility, that is, dialogic, participative responsibility, let us add at a global level, as foreseen by dialogism structural to the very biological dimension of life, human and nonhuman.

The dialogical dimension of the sign is touched upon in the monumental handbook, Semiotik/Semiotics, edited by Roland Posner, Klaus Robering and Thomas A. Sebeok (1997-2004), but without indepth studies. Instead, in Bakhtin’s interpretation, sign theory is founded in dialogism and cannot be neglected. Whether we like it or not, dialogue is involvement with the other, intricate implication with the other, and cannot be evaded. Dialogue is compromise and indifference toward the other. Indeed, exactly when we feign indifference we are most implicated with the other.

As observed by Bakhtin interpreter of dialogism in Dostoevsky, all this is depicted in literary writing. Dostoevsky's underground man wants to be left alone, isolated, separate from the other. The underground man does not want to have to deal with the other. Yet, he discovers himself to be

30 Ibid., 47.
31 Derrida (2003), 19.
32 Ponzio (2009), 129.
34 Levinas (1972, 1987).
36 von Uexküll (1992); Maturana and Varela (1978); Petrilli & Ponzio (2007).
37 Bakhtin e il suo Circolo (2014); Petrilli (2012); Ponzio (1996).
inextricably involved with the other in spite of himself. Dialogue is not an initiative of the subject as commonly believed, it is not initiated by an I. Dialogue is not achieved on the basis of respect toward the other, but mostly in spite of the other, through a relation of passive involvement with the other, with the word of the other, even through imposition by the other. The subject does not manifest himself in dialogue as though he were already given, already defined outside dialogue. On the contrary, the subject is constructed in dialogue and does not exist outside dialogue. The horizon of being develops and is exhausted on the horizon of dialogue, which means to say that being acquires materiality, objectivity, semiotic consistency endowed with a capacity for resistance with respect to the conscious, to all ontological constructions, to all assertions of being.

Strongly influenced by Dostoevsky, dialogue according to Bakhtin consists in the fact that one’s own word alludes always and in spite of itself, whether it knows it or not, to the word of the other. Furthermore, for both Dostoevsky and Bakhtin dialogue occurs outside the cognitive relation, outside the subject-object schema, taking shape rather as a relation of involvement in which one is placed in front of the other, in a “face-to-face” relationship, to evoke the language of Levinas. Such a situation corresponds to polyphony as depicted in his novels by Dostoevsky: “a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices [...] a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world, combine but are not merged in the unity of the event”:39

The dialogic nature of consciousness, the dialogic nature of human life itself. The single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic human life is the open-ended dialogue. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium.

Reified (materializing, objectified) images are profoundly inadequate for life and for discourse. A reified model of the world is now being replaced by a dialogic model. Every thought and every life merges in the open-ended dialogue. Also impermissible is any materialization of the word: its nature is also dialogic. Dialectics is the abstract product of dialogue.40

Today, as Umberto Eco had already predicted at the beginning of the 1990s migration, which is connected to the question of the relation between alterity and identity, presents a major problem for the European Union. “Migration,” which Eco distinguishes from traditional “emigration / immigration”41 appeals to unconditional hospitality toward the other, more than to accords and international exchanges. As such migration interrogates human rights which – as Emmanuel Levinas points out in an essay of 1985, “Droits de l’homme et droits de l’autre homme,”42 under a title that resounds as a paradox – have normally been interpreted, and continue to be so, as the rights of identity, to the exclusion of the rights of the other, autrui.43

38 Levinas (1961).
40 Ibid., 293.
41 See Eco et al. (1993); Eco, in Petrilli (2017b), 273-277.
43 Petrilli & Ponzi (2017), 218-221.
From the viewpoint of transcultural translation and of the metaphorical value of language (cf. Petrilli 2006), the English equivalent of the Italian “centro di accoglienza” or “campo di accoglienza” (literally “hospitality centre” or “hospitality camp”), translated with such expressions as “refugee camp,” “detention centre,” “asylum seeker centre,” are all expressions that recall relations of conflict, violence, hostility, rejection, punishment, isolation, social alienation, fear, by contrast with “hospitality” associated with practices of acceptance, security, friendship, care, etc. We could claim that the above expressions in English state clearly what, instead, in light of current government politics in Italy is implied but not articulated.

The question of citizenship calls for planning from the European Union that is not oriented by the “ideo-logic” of profit, self-interest, productivity, functionality, closed identity.

Moreover, the question of citizenship today, in Europe and in the USA as in all places with national identity, should not be neglected by the practitioners of semiotics, in particular “global semiotics”, oriented in the sense of “semioethics”. Semioethics evidences the relation between signs and values, hence the ethico-pragmatic dimension of semiosis, beyond the quantitative, theoretical and cognitive dimensions. As semiotics it recovers its ancient vocation as “semiotics” or “symptomatology” focused on symptoms. Semioethics is concerned with “care for life,” but from a global semiotic perspective whereby semiosis and life coincide. As such it promotes developments on the general science of signs in terms of “critical global semiotics” and can also be associated with the philosophical orientation denominated “critical realism”.

The global semiotic eyview practised in a critical key evidences the de-totised nature of the totality, the dialogical nature of the relation among parts in the flux of semiosis in becoming – which is not the flux of time that flows, but the rhythm of the dialogics between sign and signs, between continuity and innovation, in the relation among alterities – in which develops the sense and valorisation of identity itself.

To the extent that the human being like every other living being not only produces “semiosis” and is in turn engendered in semiosis, but also has a capacity for “metasemiosis,” that is, for reflection on signs and for deliberation; therefore, as a “semiotic animal” and not only a “semiotic animal,” the human being is the only life-form endowed with a capacity for responsibility towards its own species and precisely because of this toward all of life over the planet.

Responsibility thus described has nothing abstract about it, but is what the “other” demands of each “I,” simply with one’s presence. Disquietude provoked in the relation with the other is the disquietude of involvement with the other, of unindifference toward the other, even when a question of the will to expunge the other. The face of the other, in its nudity, exposition, fragility, *puts the I into the accusative*, as Levinas says, interrogating him, calling him to absolute responsibility, without alibis, to responsibility for the other that cannot be ignored or eliminated.

The question of identity is the question of alterity; and the question of citizenship is the question of how to respond to the other and for the other, how to answer to the other and for the other,
according to a perspective that cannot but evidence the egocentric short-sightedness of a conception of identity, of the community based on the right, in the best of cases, to ignore the other, but also to ban the other, to outlaw the other, even eliminate the other.\textsuperscript{50}

Global semiotics reveals how encounter with the other is inevitable, how the other cannot be escaped. We could even go so far as to say that the vocation of the sign – the material of living and of signifying, of communication (verbal and nonverbal), of human relations – is the other. The other is the indistinct background from which each one of us arises to enter this world; the other is witness to my entry into this world and my exit from it, in and out of the web of life; the other is the condition of possibility itself of life and communication.\textsuperscript{51} On stretching the gaze beyond subsystems and microsystems, global semiotics evidences the condition of total interrelation and interdependency not only among subsystems forming the anthroposphere and their porous boundaries, but also between the latter and all other subsystems constitutive of the great biosphere, in the last analysis between nature and culture as we know them, certainly to contemplation of Gaia, but possibly even beyond.\textsuperscript{52}

The quality of life, the destiny of each one of us, of every singularity is determined in the relation with the other and in consciousness of how things stand under this aspect. So long as we are alive and therefore connected in the great sign network that receives and supports us all, from the other we cannot escape; indeed, we are always somehow involved with the other, it will always be necessary to account to the other and for the other. In the last analysis, I do not elect the other; rather, the other elects me, comes to me, and with the first comer, as Levinas says, there will always be a second comer, and then a third, a fourth, and so on; and for the sake of hospitality toward these others on my part, institutions and laws must be organised so as to guarantee that human rights converge with the rights of the other.

4. Listening as an unconditional condition

If semiotics is concerned with life over the entire planet, given that life and semiosis converge, and if one of the original reasons for studying signs, precisely “symptoms,” is health, that is, the health of semiosis, therefore of life (the aim of medical semeiotics or symptomatology, the most ancient branch of semiotics), then a major task for “global semiotics” today, in the globalisation era, is interpretation of the symptoms of social malaise at a global level.

Semioticians today must listen to signs of the politico-economical and social orders, register their symptomatology as indicative of the overall poor functioning of the world system – growth of poverty, unemployment, extreme competetivity, conflict, violence, lack of security, egocentrism, isolation, stereotyping of discourse, homologation of communication, disorientation in values, sign-linguistic alienation, that is, social malaise generally in its multiple and plurifaceted forms, etc. –, and evidence the need to care for life in its globality, in search of for new forms of cohabitation, of living together, for the health of life under all its multifaceted aspects.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} Arnett (2013, 2017); Ponzio (2019).
\textsuperscript{51} Petrilli (2016b).
\textsuperscript{52} Perron et al. (2000); Sebeok (1991, 2000, 2001a, b).
\textsuperscript{53} Arnett et al. (2018); Schaff (1992); Semerari (1982); Zagrebelsky (2010).
To be capable of responsibility presupposes the propensity for listening, unindifference toward the other, close or distant as he might be, forever near, my neighbour – thanks to progress in technology, space, the entire planet, can be covered in ever shorter time spans –, participative involvement with the other, responsive understanding toward him.

Listening is decisive for global semiotics, it tells of the capacity to tune into and synchronise with the semiosic universe. Listening is connected to music. Listening is necessary for a critical discussion of separatism and of the tendency to exchange the part for the whole, the *pars pro toto* fallacy, whether by mistake or in bad faith, as in the case of exasperated individualism in social and cultural life, and the current “crisis of overspecialisation” in scientific research. The capacity for listening is a condition for connecting semiotics to its early vocation as medical semeiotics and the interpretation of symptoms, as observed by Sebeok.Keeping account of the distinction between “listening” and “hearing” described by Mikhail Bakhtin in his essay “From Notes Made in 1970-71,” “listening” unlike hearing is associated with responsive understanding and dialogism. Thus described listening produces new signifiers and interpretants without ever fixing sense in obsessive terms. The methodics of semiotics is a *methodics of listening*. Listening converges with the interpretant of responsive understanding, with the propensity for hospitality, for welcoming the signs of the other, *autrui*, for signs that are other into the house of semiotics: signs that are other to such a degree that generally we can only denominate them in the negative, that is, as “nonverbal signs.” Listening is a necessary condition to develop a general theory of signs.

Semiotics is a critical science, but not only in a Kantian sense, that is, in the sense that it investigates its own conditions of possibility. Semiotics is a critical science in the sense that it interrogates the human world today on the assumption that it is not the only possible world, it is not the definitive and finalised world as established according to some self-interested, individualistic, profit-oriented ideology. Critical semiotics contemplates the world as a possible world, a world subject to confutation, transformation, therefore as one among many possible worlds.

We interpret and develop “global semiotics” as it has been proposed and denominated by Thomas Sebeok, in the sense that it is concerned with life over the entire planet, not only in a cognitive sense, but also in the pragmatic and the ethical. A vocation for global semiotics is to care for life, one’s own and the other’s. In this sense semiotics, as observed, recovers its relation with medical semeiotics not simply from the point of view of history, of the search for the origins, but on the programmatic and operative levels.

Semiotics is listening in the medical sense as well, as practiced in medical semeiotics or symptomatology. Semiotics must listen to the symptoms of today’s globalised world and identify the different expressions of unease and illness therein – in social relations, in international relations, in the life of single individuals, in the environment, in life generally over the whole planet. According to the orientation in semiotics we have proposed to denominate “semioethics,” we are called to diagnose, prognose and indicate possible remedies for the future of globalisation, for the health of semiosis overall, of life, by contrast to a globalised world tending toward its very own destruction.

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54 Petrilli (2019a).
55 Sebeok (1986).
57 Petrilli & Ponzio (2016).
The contemporary world, the world-as-it-is, is overwhelmed by dominant “ideo-logic” whose reach today is global, unbounded, thanks to a communication network that is just as unlimited, thereby acting as the perfect support for the overarching system. Semioethics underlines the need for awareness of the role of values in our sign systems, our life systems. In the human world, signs and values converge, they belong to the same packet; where there are values there a signs, the material of values are signs, values are construed and communicated through signs, whether verbal or nonverbal, and signs, properly human signs are perfused with values. With the axiom which posits that where there is life there is semiosis, 58 this is another axiom we cannot escape: properly human signs are perfused with values. 59 Our language, here also in the sense of our overall behaviour, whether verbal or nonverbal, is always intonated, accentuated, orientated in one direction or another, and in behaviour thus described the presence of small and great ideological systems are easily recognisable.

This does not justify an attitude of passive acceptance of the current state of affairs, it should not translate into justification for passivity, fatality, of indifference simply because we enter an already given world, an already intonated world, an already delineated “social planning”. 60 We have claimed that the vocation of the sign is the other. The allusion is also to otherness constitutive of identity, that is, to the singularity and uniqueness of each and every one of us, therefore to the capacity for creativity and critique, for excess with respect to any one given system, for transcendence and escape from the repressive tendencies of a given social and linguistic order, the “order of discourse.” 61 Involvement, participation in the life of the other, whether the other from me, or the other of me is inevitable. And directly proportional to today’s situation of global interconnection is the need for critique, listening and love, love for one’s neighbour, as close or as distant as that neighbour might be. To evoke Charles Peirce, for the sake of “evolutionary development,” the continuity of synchism and the chance of tychism can do nothing on their own account without agapism, the agency of love. Love, as Peirce avers in the last essay of his 1892 series, 62 is at the beginning of the universe. 63 As Dante Alighieri says, it is “love that moves the sun and other stars”. 64

5. Beyond reason: reasonableness

Thanks to its broad perspective semiotics is in a position to account for the “reason of things.” At the same time, however, a deontological perspective (so written as distinct from the adjective “deontological” deriving from “deontology,” “science of morality,” “normative science”) is necessary, in the sense of critique, of the dismantling of ontology, the inclination for detotalisation as the condition for critical and dialogical totalisation. Moreover, the capacity to grasp the reason of things should not be separated from reasonableness. Even more, as Peirce says: “Logic came about for the sake of reasonableness, not reasonableness for the sake of logic. Let us never lose sight of that truth, forgotten though it is, every

59 Bakhtin (1986, 1993); Volosinov (1929).
61 Foucault (1971).
63 Deledalle (1990), 70.
64 Dante Alighieri (Paradise, XXXIII, 145).
day, in every walk of life ...”

65 So our claim is that the human being must change at the very earliest – given all the risks (for semiosis and for life) inherent in today’s historical situation – from a rational animal into a reasonable animal. 66

Both Peirce and Welby have contributed importantly to a global science of the sign, capable of taking signifyng processes into consideration in all their complexity and articulation, of considering meaning both on the side of signification and of sense and significance. 67 For both Welby and Peirce our approach to the life of signs and to the signs of life cannot be purely descriptive, thus it cannot make claims to neutrality, otherwise it would be partial and inadequate for understanding the forces that move the universe and those who inhabit it.

Moreover, for a better understanding of the conscious and of human behavior generally, semiotics must extend its gaze not only in the direction of “zoosemiotics” and “biosemiotics,” as indicated by Sebeok, but also in the direction of so-called “cosmosemiotics,” comprehensive of “geosemiotics” and “heliosemiotics,” as we may infer from both Welby and Peirce. 68

From the perspective of human social semiotics, our gaze must also embrace the fields of ethics, aesthetics and ideology. Therefore, it must extend beyond the logico-gnoseological boundaries of semiosical processes in order to put into focus problems of the axiological order, problems concerning our capacity and disposition for valuation and critique, thereby moving in the direction of what we have denominated as “semioethics.” Victoria Welby coined the term “significs” to indicate the scope of her theory of meaning, which includes the problematic of the relation between signs and values. And precisely because of this signifies provides an important signpost for the constitution of semioethics. In fact, the term itself “significs” designates the disposition toward critique and valuation, appreciation of the value conferred upon something, its pertinent, import, signifying value, significance.

On his part, Peirce, coherently with his “pragmaticism,” developed cognitive semiotics in close relation to the study of man’s social behavior and the totality of his interests. It follows that the problem of knowledge necessarily involves considerations of the axiological order. Reasonableness is understood as dialectic-dialogical signifyng process, as development unobstructed by prejudice, oriented instead by search for the other, as unfinished and unfinalisable process, regulated by the principle of continuity or “synechism,” or in Peirce’s terminology, the doctrine of “synechism”. 69

Peirce transcended the limits of merely gnoseologic semiotics working in the direction of what can be described as an “ethical-pragmatic” or “valuative-operative” or, as proposed above, “semioethical” approach.

Significantly, in the final phase of his research, Peirce specifically turned his attention to the normative sciences, in addition to logic, these include aesthetics and ethics, hence to the question of ultimate value, of the sumum bonum, which he identified in the “evolutionary process,” more precisely the “growth of reasonableness,” rather than in individual satisfaction (hedonism) or the good of the collectivity (English utilitarianism):

65 Peirce (CP 2.195).
67 See Morris (1964); Peirce (1923); Petrilli (2009); Welby (1983).
69 Peirce explains this concept in the essays “The Law of Mind” (CP 6.102-163); “Man’s Glassy Essence”(CP 6.238-271); “The Logic of Continuity”(CP 6.185-213); and in his (1902) entries for Baldwin’s dictionary (CP 6.164-168, 169-173; and he returns to it in his writings on pragmatism, above all in 1906 (CP 6.174-176).
Almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some way. If so, it is not in individual reactions in their segregation, but in something general or continuous. Synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness. This is first shown to be true with mathematical exactitude in the field of logic, and is thence inferred to hold good metaphysically. It is not opposed to pragmatism in the manner in which C.S. Peirce applied it, but includes that procedure as a step.70

As we can infer from Peirce’s semiotic perspective, the dialogic conception of signs – therefore of the human conscious – and subtending otherness logic together constitute a necessary condition for continuity or “synechism,” the doctrine that “all that exists is continuous” in the development of the universe and of human beings inhabiting it. Dialogism and otherness account for synechism, thus for the driving forces exerted on evolutionary processes, as foreseen by synechism, by relation in discontinuity, chaos, inexactitude, uncertainty, unascertainability, in the last analysis by fallibilism.71

The dialogical relation between self and other, the other of self and the other from self, is one of the most important conditions for continuity in the creative process. Love is among the main factors for creativity. And on Peirce’s account love is directed to the concrete and not to abstractions; toward one’s neighbour, such not necessarily in a spatial sense, locally, but through affinity, a person “we live near [...] in life and feeling”.72 Love is a driving force in logical procedure characterised in terms of abduction, iconicity and creativity. The most advanced developments in reason and knowledge are nourished by the creativity of reasonableness and the forces of agapasm. In Peirce’s conception of evolution, which he develops with reference to St. John’s Gospel and Emanuel Swedenborg’s theosophy, reason inspired by love becomes reasonableness, such that even the hateful is transformed into the loveable:

Everybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love, from I will not say self-sacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to fulfill another’s highest impulse. [...] It is not dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can make them grow, but by cherishing and tending them as I would the flowers in my garden. The philosophy we draw from John’s gospel is that this is the way mind develops; and as for the cosmos, only so far as it yet is mind and so has life, is it capable of further evolution. Love, recognizing germs of loneliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life and makes it lovely. That is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay “The Law of Mind” must see that synechism calls for.73

Thus conceived, reasonableness transforms horror of the stranger, the alien – today the “illegal,” “sans papier,” “refugee,” “asylum seeker” – fear of the other – understood as fear that the subject experiences toward the outsider with respect to self, and not fear experienced by the object, the other’s fear, even less so one’s fear for the other – into sympathy for the other become loveable. Developing Peirce’s discourse in the direction of Levinas’s philosophy of subjectivity, we might add that underneath fear of the other which stirs under the hardened crust of the I’s identity,74 love rediscovers fear for the other, for

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70 Peirce, CP 5.4.
71 Ibid., CP 1.172.
72 Ibid., CP 6.288.
73 Ibid., CP 6.289 (1893).
the other’s safety, fear that the Ident perceives as disquieting, which troubles the I in one’s otherness. Love, reasonableness, creativity find a common foundation in the logic of otherness and dialogism, and as the authors so far cited teach us, put the evolutionary dynamics of human consciousness into harmony with the entire universe.

Keeping account of “dialogism” as conceived by Mikhail Bakhtin, dialogue is not reduced to the exchange of messages, nor to initiative taken by a subject, but tells of the original condition of intercorporeality as a necessary requisite for life and communication to continue flourishing. Self is always in dialogue with the other, with the world and with others, with the word of the other, whether one knows it or not; self is always in dialogue. Identity is dialogic. Dialogism is at the very heart of the self. The self, “the semiotic self”75 is dialogic in the sense of a species-specifically modeled involvement with the world and with others. The self is implied dialogically in otherness, just as the “grotesque body” (Bakhtin 1965) is implied in the body of other living beings. In Bakthin’s vision of the world in fact dialogue and intercorporeity are closely interconnected.

The dialogic relation between self and other, the other of self and the other from self, is a condition for the development of creativity, of each and every one in one’s singularity, dialogism is a condition for the development of the capacity for relation overall and for responsibility toward the other, and for politics undistorted in terms of “identity politics,” closed identity – which generates “identity conflicts” and which only obtains peace as a product of war, as a truce from war –, this is politics open to the other, politics of alterity (cf. Petrilli 2017c). In addition to reasonableness and love, the most advanced developments in reason and knowledge are based on the creativity of relation.

“Realistic politics” is connected with the ontology of war as the true face of the real, consequently realistic politics is programmed for “preventive war.” Preventive war, “humanitarian war,” has been proclaimed as “just and necessary” in our globalised world and in truth presents nothing new under the sun with respect to the familiar adage “if you want peace prepare for war.” Contrary to all this reading Peirce with Levinas we could claim that “preventive peace,” the otherwise than “realistic politics,” consists in rediscovering the rights of the other, autre, under the hardened crust of identity: “Droits de l’homme et droits de l’autre homme”76 is the significant title of one of Levinas’s most important and most “political” essays. Reflections by such figures as Peirce, but also Welby, prefigure and clarify issues connected with the alterity relation as thematised by Levinas, the philosopher of alterity par excellence. The following passage is from his 1972 book, Humanisme de l’autre homme:

Le Désir d’Autrui que nous vivons dans la plus banale expérience sociale, est le mouvement fondamental, le transport pure, l’orientation absolue, le sens. Dans toute son analyse du langage, la philosophie contemporaine insiste, certes avec raison, sur sa structure herméneutique et sur l’effort culturel de l’être incarné qui s’exprime. N’a-t-on pas oublié une troisième dimension: la direction vers Autrui qui n’est pas seulement le collaborateur et le voisin de notre œuvre culturel d’expression ou le client de notre production artistique, mais l’interlocuteur: celui à qui l’expression exprime, pour qui la célébration célébre, lui, à la fois, terme d’une orientation et signification première? Autrement dit, l’expression, avant d’être célébration de l’être, est une relation avec celui à qui j’exprime l’expression et dont la présence est déjà requise pour que mon geste culturel d’expression se produise. Autrui qui me fait face n’est pas inclus dans la totalité de l’être exprimé. Il resurgit derrière tout rassemblement de l’être, comme celui à qui j’exprime ce que j’exprime. Je me retrouve en face d’Autrui. Il n’est ni un signification culturelle, ni un simple donné. Il est sens primordialement car il le prête à l’expression elle-même, car par lui seulement un phénomène tel qu’une

76 Levinas (1985).
signification s’introduit, de soi, dans l’être.\textsuperscript{77}

6. Identity and alterity in Europe

In a collective volume \textit{Europa. Costituzione, lingua} (Europe. Contitution, language), 2006, Augusto Ponzio claims that events of the 1960s - student protests in Berkeley, USA, the 1968 student movements in Europe, with special reference to “French May,” and the new political course with the “Prague Spring” - all seemed very distant from each other, signaling that the capitalist world was not homogeneous and so-called “real socialism” was not monolithic.\textsuperscript{78} This state of affairs also reveals how what we undersign as our identity, affiliation, citizenship is open to re-interpretation without necessarily falling into the trap of short-sighted deresponsabilisation toward the other in the face of identity.\textsuperscript{79}

The events described now seem so distant that it seems as though many years have passed. Since then new identities have emerged, small and large identity spheres, characterised by strong corporative tendencies: one of these is the European Union. The expression “extracommunitarian” is symptomatic of how the EU was perceived at the time and still is. The value of this term is not merely descriptive, it does not only have “denotation,”\textsuperscript{80} but also “connotation,” as Roland Barthes says using this specific expression.\textsuperscript{81}

The term “extracommunitarian” presents a new stereotype\textsuperscript{82} and like all stereotypes its meanings and signifying implications as much as the behaviour it promotes are not defined once and for all, are not fixed in written codes. If the term “extracommunitarian” solely designated peoples and political spheres not part of the European Community, its reference would be so obvious as to render exploitation redundant. But the term is not only used to indicate Americans from the United States or Japanese tourists in Europe. “Extracommunitarian” refers primarily to migrants haunting Europe in search of work: Algerians, domestic collaborators, peddlers, labourers, farm hands, and all those non-Europeans who reach our shores hoping for integration into European society. The conception of “extracommunitarian” does not only continue to be topical in Europe today, but is enhanced with new meanings, referents and events with the spread of new forms of xenophobia and racism.

In “Sur la ‘constitution de l’Europe’. Crises et virtualités,” Etienne Balibar observes that the European Constitution was characterised from the very beginning by a “great uncertainty,” one that has given rise to numerous problems, and continues to do so, which he groups around four \textit{aporias}. For what concerns us here, the most interesting is the first, the problem of the “peoples’ sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{83}

As jurists and philosophers have averred, and as Balibar also maintains, to speak of the sovereignty of the European peoples is impossible, therefore illegitimate, given the “difficulty in tracing the European peoples.” It ensues that popular sovereignty has gradually been characterised in terms of nationalism, cultural differentiation, but also contrast and conflict among national identities. In front of what could prove to be the greatest threat ever for the European Union today, the proliferation of

\textsuperscript{77} Levinas (1972), 49–50.
\textsuperscript{78} Cf. Ponzio (2006a, 2006b).
\textsuperscript{79} Cf. Bakhtin (2019); Petrilli (2019b).
\textsuperscript{80} Morris (1938).
\textsuperscript{81} Barthes (1975).
\textsuperscript{82} Schaff (1980).
\textsuperscript{83} Balibar (2006), 27.
different forms of “national populism” throughout the countries forming the EU, Balibar’s considerations are ever more relevant.

A major cause behind the difficulties facing European Union countries today, paradoxical as this may seem, is that they share the same “ideology,” as this concept is understood by Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, that is, as “social planning”: dominant social planning identifies with the interests of the equal exchange market. Ideology is so embedded in the reality of capitalist social planning, thus in the reality of the equal exchange market as to appear as its inevitable logic, the only logic possible, in this sense “ideology” may be described as “ideo-logic.” The contradictions that emerge in the EU putting it into difficulty are the contradictions characteristic of the current dominant social system, precisely competition, conflict, profit, self-interest, values which inevitably put identities against other, even when a question of national identities or smaller identity spheres internal to the same nation, in Italy, for example, between North and South.

A propos the aporias evidenced by Balibar in relation to the “European constitution,” Ponzio too in the same volume, emphasises contradictions and potentialities thereof with special reference to the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, a particularly significant moment of encounter. The results of the conference were published in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 mentioned above. However, with the 1991 turn in world politics and the “Gulf War,” this document is now no more than a dead letter.

The Helsinki Final Act was signed by thirty-three participating States of Europe, together with USSR and USA and by Canada, as such considered unanimously as a milestone in relations between West and East. Three arguments were identified at the Helsinki conference in support of co-operation among nations worldwide: 1) the question of mutual involvement among states, of impossible indifference to each other, therefore the inevitability of mutual responsibility and solidarity; 2) the question of accords to be undersigned freely by autonomous and self-sufficient entities; 3) and of common traditions, history, and values bonding participating states. However, of the three argumentative strains only the second and third were asserted in favor of “co-operation” for the sake of peace, security and health of all peoples. Consequently, point one and all it implied was overshadowed, if not completely left aside in the overall discourse: briefly, that peace and security in Europe not only concerns all of Europe, but the whole world, and can only be achieved on the basis of peaceful mutual relations among participating and non-participating States. By comparison with the Helsinki Final Act an appeal is missing to non-identity responsibility, which in fact it had envisaged. Consequently, the Helsinki Final Act in a sense has ended up becoming no more than a declaration of good intentions, losing in argumentative force and the possibility of influencing the European Union or international politics generally, as registered by history from the 1991 Gulf War through to this very day.

7. The European Constitution: a real entity or and illusion?

It is important to reflect on the European Constitution and its conditions of possibility in a global semiotic framework oriented critically: is a European Constitution effectively possible? This question obviously needs to be treated from several points of view, at least as many as are the technical

84 Rossi-Landi (1978).
85 Ponzio (2006b), 337-344.
competencies required to construct such a complex model as the European Union – competencies of the juridical, economical, political, anthropological, sociological, geographical, demographic, historical, linguistic, ethical orders, etc. The EU today is under interrogation and is called to respond to questions that bear multifaceted implications: the economic crisis, poverty, migration, war, terrorism, organised criminality, the rise of separatist nationalism, of internet populism, and not least of all, with geopolitical issues, the overriding environmental crisis.

Our own perspective is philosophical in dialogue with the semiotical, or better *semioethical*, an approach that we believe is foundational for the plurality of voices that constitute Europe and its signs. Global semiotics evidences how the European Community, but in truth any community, belongs to ever larger systems of interconnected and interdependent communities. A concept that puts an interesting perspective on the human community in its totality in both time and space, chronotopically, is that of “indigeneity” used to account for the planetary condition of dynamical interconnectedness in the global semiotic network, while at once recognizing the structural role and inescapable presence of alterity and cultural difference.86 The totality itself “European Union” or “European Community” is multi-faceted, made of smaller interconnected totalities which, at least ideally, should be interconnected dialogically as part of a detotalised global world community. On this account, founding documents for the EU such as “The Ventotene Manifesto,” “The Helsinki Final Act,” and “The European Constitution” are worth rereading in a global semiotic and semioethical key for values on the basis of which to relaunch a vision of Europe formed of citizens “united in diversity,” for the sake of a safe and healthy future overall, for “happy humanity,” as recites the title of a book by Frederik van Eeden,87 one of Victoria Welby’s interlocutors, very much in tune with Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, another of her major interlocutors, and author of *Studies in Humanity*.88

Critical global semiotics evidences a fact that is vital for life, which is that the totality, whatever it may be, is constructed in the relation with the other, in communication with the other, with alterity-difference. In this sense, insofar as it is constructed through intercorporeal and relational relations among alterities, the totality is always *detotalisable*. It is not possible to do without the other if the aim is synechetic continuity of semiosis, in Peirce’s sense of “synechism,” therefore, continuity of life if, as averred by Sebeok, semiosis and life converge.

In a world characterised by globalisation, international relations and migration, the question of citizenship also calls for a global and dialogical approach. Balibar discusses “imperfect citizenship,” alluding to citizenship as an open, dynamical practice, a process, “in the making,” “in becoming,” as foreseen by the nature itself of semiosis we might add.89 The question of citizenship is connected to migration. The “politics of immigration” is among the most interesting policies articulated by the EU in the 2004 Constitution, with prospects for evolution and transformation.91

The European constitution for a united Europe presupposes a vision of the world that places the human person at the centre of value, the “centre of life” as recites “The Ventotene Manifesto,” whose full title is “For a Free and United Europe. A draft manifesto.” This Manifesto was drawn up by Altiero

86 Ricca (2018).
87 Van Eeden (1912).
88 Schiller (1907).
89 Peirce (CP 1.172).
Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi (who wrote the first part of the third chapter), in 1941, during their time on the island of Ventotene where they were interned for opposing the Fascist regime. The “Manifesto” opens with the following declaration, which resounds as a description of human rights that have been acquired and as a project for future development:

Modern civilization has taken the principle of freedom as its basis, a principle which holds that man must not be a mere instrument to be used by others but an autonomous centre of life. With this code at hand, all those aspects of society that have not respected this principle have been placed on trial, a great historical trial.

In addition to the problem of liberating man from the status of mere instrument at the service of the selfish other, the problem of living together also calls for attention, in communities aiming for sustainability, cooperation, humanisation. As a semiotic animal, or metasemiosic animal, the human being is capable of reflection, conscious awareness, creativity, innovation, inventiveness, critique and deliberation and as such is the only animal capable of responsibility for the entire community and not only for self.

The vocation of any community whatsoever is the other, without the other the community cannot subsist, even when a question of the European community. The other, effectively other, is the condition of possibility for constitution of the community where relations begin from each single component as soon as one perceives oneself as an “I” with respect to an “other,” and considers the “other” from the viewpoint of the “I.” This is a far cry from considering the community as a system of relations among people considered as identities, similar, the same, as citizens whom insofar as they are citizens are identical, concrete abstractions, forming a homogeneous totality in the eyview of the external observer. In truth, the expression “community” does not work well for it recalls a system, an assemblage of entities united on the basis of similarity, thus viewed from an external gaze. “Society” is the more adequate expression, or for want of anything better we propose such expressions as “open community,” “intercommunity,” “transcommunity,” if reference is to the possibility of living together in relations where as a singularity we each recognise our responsibility toward the other.

To recognise the inexorable role of the other for the continuity of life, language and communication is to transition from the status of “rational animal” to “reasonable animal.” By virtue of its broad scope semiotics is able to account for the “reason of things,” but at the same time thanks to the human capacity for detotalisation, the condition for critical and dialogical totalisation, reason cannot be separated from reasonableness. In the face of the risks for semiosis and life in the present day world at a global level, humans must very quickly transform from rational animals into reasonable animal.

From the point of view of citizenship, we are each one of us a citizen of the world whose survival depends upon healthy relations with the other, for what concerns us here the human other, but health relations with the nonhuman other are no less important. From a biosemiotic eyview sustainability of the social environment clearly depends upon the state of health of the natural environment, of the planet generally. Reasonableness is opening to the other, listening to the other, recognising the other

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93 “Il Manifesto di Ventotene” (1941).
as a centre of value, of the community, the open community, and of the I understood as a community. Following such logic it is clear that contrary to the construction of barriers and walls, to the dissemination of fear that barriers and walls consolidate and amplify, contrary to the assertion of human rights that do not account for the rights of the other, to the negation of human rights open to the other, contrary to militarising the world, to legalising possession of weapons by citizens for personal defence, contrary to the right to armed self-defence as a civil right, the condition for living together in security and peace calls for recognition of intercorporeality as the load-bearing structure in the network of signs and life, recognition of dialogism understood à la Bakhtin as interconnectedness with the other, unindifference to the other, co-operation with the other, hospitality and listening to the other. The arms race in the geo-political sphere, conflict, to the point even of war translate into profits for the arms industry: in terms of social planning all this marks a failure, nothing less than the failure of the aspiration to building modern civilisation on humanising values, where sense is given by each single unique individual as a value in himself, as other with respect to instrumentality, functionality to an end that is not the human person himself.

Characteristic of contemporaneity is the tendency to expel the other as a function of the identical, the same, and of reducing community to the identical; the tendency to destroy the possibility of living together, in peace, among alterities in their multiple forms; destruction of communities, of nations, of life itself, of the environment.

In the globalised world to think of the community to which one belongs is inexorably to think of the other in ever broader community terms, world-wide and planetary. The issue at stake is of a global order and concerns us all, the single individual in the relation with the other single individual, face-to-face in the open community.

8. Justice, migration, citizenship

Migration today is associated more than ever before with the figure of the “extracommunitarian,” so defined both in terms of origins with respect to the community and of civil status within the same community – in English “illegals,” “queue jumpers,” “aliens,” “asylum seekers,” “refugees,” in French “sans papier,” in Italian “clandestini,” etc. –, a figure ousted from the community, outside the community even whilst lingering within it, outside with respect to the official order of discourse, outside the political, economic, juridical, social order. Insofar as he or she is physically present on a given territory, within national state borders, the extracommunitarian is commonly considered as an intruder, classified as illegal, as one who does not belong, inopportune, uncivil (according to recurrent terminology). As these expressions in the sign of extromission tell us – particularly significant are the qualifications that applied to the extracommunitarian underline the condition of residency without a

permit, of remaining without belonging, without hospitality, or the possibility of social integration –, the migrant is undesirable as never before, to be expelled at the very earliest, with all possible means. In common language the presence of the migrant on one’s territory, in the best of cases tolerated, is associated to the need for barriers, to the dissemination of fear and to the negation of human rights, first of all the right to citizenship.

Qualifying terms such as the adjective “illegals,” used as a noun, evidence the presence in the community of invisible human resources, for this very reason vulnerable, without protection or security, completely exposed – to brutal forms of exploitation, economic and other, to all sorts of criminal trafficking, to new forms of slavery.95 Thanks precisely to the condition of invisibility, obligation to permanency in “heterotopy,” in the no-place of not belonging, in the sphere of extracommunitariness, “aliens” are ever more alienated, socially, linguistically and legislatively in the current economical system.

Simply by virtue of existing, as absolute alterity with respect to the official order, the extracommunitarian asks to be taken into consideration, requests listening and hospitality, and that as a “citizen of the world,” a “global citizen,” he or she be recognised the right to inclusion, to social integration.96

In the face of migratory fluxes that do not hint at diminishing, even at the risk of life, national States in Europe, but also beyond, in the USA, in Australia, etc., apply politics of exclusion supported by repressive legislative measures, instead of committing to scientific investigation for an adequate understanding of a problem afflicting the globalised world for many decades now, in view of a sustainable solution in terms of humane humanity. With the pretext of security – whose’, to whom’s advantage? – the current tendency in the European Union is to expel the other, the migrant, with an attitude that cannot but generate new forms of social alienation, new forms of exploitation and precariousness in civil society, and as an inevitable consequence new forms of violence, conflict and criminality. The army of the invisible is destined to grow, reproducing a situation that in Europe is already consolidated, as in France for example with the banlieue population at the margins of official society, or the underground population of the great metropolitan network, but also in Italy with the demographic expansion of popular suburbs surrounding the centre – Pier Paolo Pasolini had already denounced emargination and misery in the Roman suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s –, and again in England, and so forth throughout the whole of Europe. But this is a tendency that can also be traced in countries like the USA, a sign of which is the increase in poverty and its expansion from the ghettos of the inner city to surrounding suburbia.

The invisibles are extracommunitarian migrants without citizenship. But the migrant symbolizes a class of invisibles that is far broader, a symptom of global social dysfunctioning, and which regards all the poor of the earth, citizens included, such as the unemployed, in turn extracommunitarian with respect to the community – the work community, the community of the well-to-do, the protected classes, etc.97 Paradoxically, even among the disowned, the underdogs of society social alienation thus connoted is accompanied by a rise in discrimination with its different faces as it becomes more dramatic – racial, gender, religious, class, generational. In Europe a clear symptom of racial discrimination, of the

97 Ponzio (2020).
push to build walls and expunge the other is the so-called “Brexit” phenomenon, Britain’s plan to exit the European Union.

With reference to citizenship in Italy, important changes were introduced in 2018 (law 132/2018) with respect to 1992 (law 91/1992) and communicated with a circular (n. 0321/0118) dated 25 January 2019, issued by the Ministry of the Interior. The measures introduced in 2018 and communicated with the 2019 circular are restrictive with respect to the 1992 law, worsening conditions that had already been foreseen to obtain Italian citizenship. To exemplify, and after having disclaimed the ius soli reform for the institution of citizenship, the following actions should be noted: increase in waiting time for the definition of citizenship on the basis of residency or matrimony; higher levels in knowledge of the Italian language as a requisite; introduction of a six month term for certification recognising Italian citizenship through the status of iure sanguinis; the possibility of revoking Italian citizenship obtained through marriage, residency or election on one’s eighteenth birthday in the case of irrevocable conviction for crimes connected with terrorism and eversion. To increased difficulty in accessing citizenship and to longer waiting time, add that an application may be rejected, for the State to decide, and higher costs. These measures further obstacle the integration process not only for migrants on the move, but even among the sedentary population, among resident migrants, citizens who up till now had been formally protected.

Even the “squatters” (often ex-prisoners) who arrived in Australia from England, from the end of the eighteenth century and across the whole nineteenth century, occupying Crown lands illegally, enjoyed better rights, eventually forming a so-called “squattocracy” by contrast to traditional “aristocracy.” These are the upheavals of history operated and legitimated according to a given project, a given vision of the world, in this case colonialism propagated by the British empire, connected to the capitalist economic system and its logic of exploitation, dominion and control.\(^{98}\)

All this occurred at the expense of the indigenous peoples, Australian aboriginals, nomads blocked and annihilated through programmed, silent genocide and finally swallowed up by the Western world. And as though this were not enough, the survivors, witnesses and victims of typically inhumane behaviour, were denied citizenship in their own land – a Western institution no doubt, foreign to Indigenous Australians, but at the time a necessary imposition for visibility, even if a question of accessing the vision of one’s exploiters and persecutors. The struggle for civil rights to the advantage of Indigenous peoples in Australia has a long history, presenting a narrative about the unending violation of human rights, which ends with the recognition and inclusion in the constitution of Indigenous peoples as Australian citizens only as late as 1967, following the referendum held that year. However, this was not the end of the story.\(^ {99}\) Prior to the 1960s, toward the end of the 1940s and beginning 1950s recognition was granted to the Indigenous population, but only partially and on hard conditions, abusive of human rights, including the obligation to deny ethnic, cultural and linguistic origins.\(^ {100}\)

### 9. Identity and Identities

Paradoxically, the unification of Europe has had the effect of reinforcing identity, nationalistic,

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99 Gale (2017); also Moreton-Robinson (2017); Pugliese (2017); Rijswijk (2017).
100 Petrilli (2017a), 37-53.
ethnocentric and logocentric tendencies, connected with the Western logos, with foundations in the economic reality of capitalism in the globalisation phase, that is, in the communication-production phase. As remarked by Edgard Morin in *Penser l'Europe*:

> Europe has developed to the extreme and spread the obsessive and insane search for Salvation, religious intolerance, capitalism, the technocratic system, the unrestrained will to power and the unrestrained will to profit, the frenetic myth of Development, the destruction of human cultures and natural environments throughout the world [...] Abandonning forever the ambition of taking a unique and rationalizing standpoint, Europe with respect to different cultures can represent a viewpoint that is other and unexpected which can help develop her self-recognition and autonomy.\(^1\)

Homologation of communication, of closed communities, of cultural and national identities translates into the lack of diversity among languages, reduction of expressivity in favour of direct, functional and efficient communication, denial of the condition of dialogism and intercorporeality. To the closed community there corresponds a closed discourse universe, the closing of human semiosical horizons, which means to level and repress not only verbal expression, but vitality of life itself, imagination, desire. As observed by Italo Calvino:

> a pestilence has struck the human race in its most distinctive faculty – that is, the use of words. It is a plague afflicting language, revealing itself as a loss of cognition and immediacy, an automatism that tends to level out all expression into the most generic, anonymous, and abstract formulas, to dilute meanings, to blunt the edge of expressiveness, extinguishing the spark that shoots out from the collision of words and new circumstance. [...] This plague strikes also at the lives of people and the history of nations [...].\(^2\)

All this describes the context in which EU identity is constructed in the present day and age, a closed identity characteristic of a closed community, according to terms imposed by the logic of capital, oriented in the sense of so-called “free market,” neo-liberal ideology. Whilst there is freedom of circulation inside the EU, this is fundamentally freedom of the market, of competition, freedom to buy and sell commodities and to maintain levels of lifestyle foreseen by market society.

Justice and security are conditioned in like way by identity logic, by social organisation as foreseen by the economic order. In the section “Definition and objectives of the Union” (Article I-3, Part I, Title I), the Constitution recites that

> The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal market where competition is free and undistorted.

But while the European citizen circulates no doubt in this space of freedom, security and justice, this is not the case for the extracomunitarian.

In *On the Jewish Question*, Karl Marx\(^3\) analyses the relation between State and civil society in terms of the relation between difference and unindifference. Each citizen in the liberal State is called to participate in popular sovereignty in the same measure regardless of differences in birth, social status,

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culture, religion, profession. Recognition of the existence of these differences is the condition of existence of the State as State:

The perfect political state is by its nature the species-life of Man as opposed to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist in civil society outside the political sphere as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained to its full development, man leads, not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life, a double existence – celestial and terrestial. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being and in civil society where he acts simply as a private individual, treats other men as means, degrades himself to the role of a mere means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers.  

The real relation between man and civil society, the bourgeois, the man of differences, on one hand, and the man of political life, the citizen on the other, is distorted by bourgeois ideology. In fact, man in general, the citizen, is attributed with characteristics belonging to the man of differences, the man of civil society. Human rights are the rights of the man of civil society, that is, the self-interested man, the egoist, selfish man separated from the other man and from the community. The right to freedom is not based on the connection between one man and the other man, between one single individual and another single individual, but on isolation of man from man, of the individual from the individual, of the closed individual each isolated in his own identity. Difference is conceived as identity closed in a class, genre, type. The right to freedom of man considered as an isolated, closed, self-interested monad, is the right of the closed, selfish individual concerned exclusively with his own self-interests, indifferent to the other.  

This conception of man separate from the other man was critiqued by Charles Peirce as delusory:

The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man,  

“... proud man,  
Most ignorant of what he’s most assured,  
His glassy essence”  
(Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, II, 2).

Rereading On the Jewish Question the objective of political life, the life of man as a community entity, as a generic citizen is civil society. The individual with his private and egoistic interests is exchanged for man as a citizen, and assuming the latter as man as such, as man in general, ideology justifies through this overturning the real relation between State and civil society. It ensues that the quality of citizen as a member of political society can be degraded, including on the level of ideology, to the mere status of means to the end of safeguarding “human rights,” in truth the rights of the egoist, of closed identity.

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104 Ibid., 34.  
105 Cf. Ibid., 178.  
And yet modern civilization, as observed, places the problem of man at its very foundations. Historically, by contrast to the feudal system, the Nation-State represented the formation of a larger community which, with its constitution and laws, was intended to safeguard the interests and health of the people, till then subjected to the tyranny of their rich and powerful masters, the governing noble class. On the contrary, with the Nation-State – the reference unit for organisation of collective life in the global framework of human society – and dominant ideology reflecting national independence, the principle of peaceful cohabitation and of solidarity among citizens is asserted. Redeemed from the condition of mere instrument, the citizen is elevated to centre of value, with full rights to freedom, equality, fraternity. But birth of the Nation-State carried the germs of capitalist imperialism and this ended up favouring the formation of totalitarian states, investments in military power, and the destruction of two world wars.

With assertion of the principle of the Nation-States’ absolute sovereignty there advances together the Nation-State’s will to dominion, whereby each Nation-State aims to stand over all others weaker than itself, in order to guarantee its own freedom and independence, its own selfish and egocentric existence. The vision of the world at the origin of the Nation-State, inspired in the overall picture of collective life by the values of cohabitation among citizens in dialogic relations of interdependency and interconnection, is put into crisis and the citizen is again transformed from the status of state ward to a subject at the service of a new master, the grand political, national and international powers.

The advance of nationalism in Europe, so-called “sovereignism,” involves fragmentation of larger entities of the political, economic, ethnic, and religious orders. The logic of the closed community, barricaded in itself, obsessed with identity to the exclusion of the other continues to advance. And transformed into the enemy, the other, above all the extracommunitarian becomes a pretext and justification for the need to reinforce national security and invest in the arms industry. In many Nations in addition to the economic order the military order dominates over the civil and renders the good functioning of free political and cultural organs ever more difficult, including education, scientific research, the production-circulation of commodities, administrative organisms, social services, and not least of all the circulation of people.

Paradoxically, a movement in two contradictory directions is advancing in the global world, one in the sense of unification and the other of fragmentation. In the general organization of things, the world is slave to the economic order, which at this time in history ultimately means to the corporative logic of a handful of multinationals and their short-sighted egotistic self-interests. What is lacking is a movement just as strong politically and culturally, with a sensibility for constructive criticism ready to elect as the centre of value life, health, the other and the capacity for listening to that other.

For what concerns Europe we are witnesses to Brexit, as anticipated, Britain’s plan for exit from the European Union. In this context, between the disgregation of multinational States, the dilemma of whether or not to continue belonging to unions like the European, on one side, and the situation of transculturalism and globalisation calling for international relations and accords despite attempts at autonomy, empowerment and independence, on the other, the question of the relation between national State, identity, belonging and citizenship is ever more complex, calling for revisitation.

107 Spinelli, “The Ventotene Manifesto”.
10. Searching for ways out – out-of-identity, out-of-place

A strong tendency in the world is to barricade oneself behind closed identities. Instead, to recognise the situation of spreading intercultural encounter at a global level among different peoples, religions, habits, ways of life is inevitable. The unrestrainable phenomenon of migration (as distinct from traditional emigration / immigration) goes in this sense. Migration is the shift of massive numbers of people, for different reasons rendering life impossible, in search of hospitality, of a place to stay. Hospitality is an occasion for intercultural or, rather, transcultural, also transnational encounter. Most unfortunately, however, owing to prejudice, stereotypes, ideologies that divide, that mark differences and sharpen contrasts, the modalities in which migration occurs give rise to situations that are dramatic, even tragic.

In this context, to reconsider the question of citizenship is not only necessary, but extremely urgent. This is a question of rethinking and also reactualising what goes under the name of “human rights.” And this implies the question of taking responsibility, a responsibility that not only concerns humanity overall, but even the possibility itself of life, above all the quality of life over our planet, rendered ever smaller thanks to the inevitability of encounter with all that which from “afar” has become our “neighbour.”

Already from the title of his essay “Droits de l’homme et droits de l’autre home,” Emmanuel Levinas signals that human rights are most often reduced to the rights of identity, of the I, to the exclusion of the rights of the other, with an attitude that ranges from indifference, diffidence, and fear to outright rejection, to “landing bans,” as now occurs in the Mediterranean. With the end of the era of the “Berlin wall,” we could claim that we are now in a new era, that of the “Mediterranean wall.” From the early 1990s the Mediterranean sea has become ever more a transit area for boats full of migrants attempting to reach the Italian cost. However, government politics even after saving lives goes in the direction of “rejection” and the construction of barriers, whether physical or ideological.

To sacrifice, repress, expel the other with all necessary means available is to offend the properly human, absolute alterity. The properly human presents an excess over reproduction of the Same, it is associated with singularity, uniqueness, the uncontainable with respect to identification with an assemblage of some sort, with identity-difference. Sacrifice of the properly human, of relation with the absolute other, cannot but generate malaise and social alienation. In a world where the adjective human is associated with the concept of war, as its justification, legitimising so-called “humanitarian wars,” the symptoms of different forms of social malaise, whether individual or collective, of alienated humanity, typical of “communication-production” civilisation multiply. That which remains constant is the illusion that the other can be excluded.

The extracommunitarian, the outside with respect to community identity, has multiple faces. The expression itself “extracommunitarian” indicates excess, surplus, redundancy with respect to a given community: the extracommunitarian is the alien, the illegal with respect to the community of those who have a right to citizenship; the unemployed with respect to the work community; the Muslim with respect to the Christian community; the homosexual with respect to the heterosexual community; the black person with respect to the white community; the mentally insane with respect to the sane;

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109 Eco (2019).
abnormality with respect to normality; the vulnerable, unproductive, inefficient, disabled, dysfunctional in whatever form, under whatever aspect with respect to the community geared by such values as functionality, efficiency, speediness, competetivity, productiveness.

The extracommunitarian appears every time a community is formed – whether religious, sexual, racial, cultural, linguistic, political, economic, social, juridical, as opposed to community identity and the prerequisites for identification. With respect to the community, the extracommunitarian is out of place, excluded from reproduction cycles of the identical and at once paradoxically a symptom of the inadequacy of community common places and logics. The symptoms of malaise ensue from closed, unwelcoming identity.

The question is how to get free of this situation, what direction to take, what way out? According to Marx’s vision as described in On the Jewish Question we must overcome division between the real life of the single individual, egotistically isolated from the other individual, and the abstraction of the generic man, “humankind,” on the other. According to Levinas, author of Totalité et inftini and of Autrement qu’être ou audela de l’essence, we must recover the otherness relation, the face-to-face relation among unique individuals in their singularity, absolute otherness. The request of citizenship is an appeal to the right to be taken into consideration for oneself, in one’s singularity independently of abstractions, as “concrete” as they may be, “concrete abstractions” precisely. This is a right that involves the I’s responsibility toward the other, autre, an appeal made by each one of us to human rights understood not only as the rights of identity, but also if not above all as the rights of the other.

With respect to the problem of identity, Roy Bhaskar’s “critical realism” evidences the importance of the relation,112 precisely the “relation among entities”:

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On Bhaskar’s account “identity thought” is not adequate without relationism, translating with Mikhail Bakhtin without “dialogism.” Discourse is oriented dialogically and the dialogic orientation of discourse is a property of any discourse: “The word is born in a dialogue as a living rejoinder within it; word is shaped in dialogic interaction with an alien word that is already in the object. A word forms a concept of its own object in a dialogic way.”114 The word is internally dialogic and structurally intertextual. As such it cannot be reduced to dialectics, or, rather, to the monological reason of dialectics, to what Bhaskar denominates “analytical thinking.” In his essay “From Notes Made in 1970-71,” Bakhtin describes three types of relations: 1) the relation among objects; 2) the relation between subject and object; 3) the relation among subjects; of which the third only is described as involving “dialogic relations,” that is intersubjective relations, intercorporeal relations, relations characterised by a capacity for answerability and open-endedness, unfinalisability.115 Bakhtin explains the enigma of monological dialectics as follows:

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112 See Bhaskar (1975).
113 In Archer et al. (1998), 566.
115 Bakhtin (1970-71), 138-139.
Dialogue and dialectics. Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of voices), remove the intonations (emotional and individualizing ones), carve out abstract concepts and judgments from living words and responses, cram everything into one abstract consciousness – and that’s how you get dialectics.116

Like Bakhtin Bhaskar too is concerned with putting the voices back into the dialectical conscious thereby recovering the dialogical vitality of the utterance, thus the intersubjective, intercorporeal dimension of the relation.

To “critical realism” we could respond by juxtaposing “semiotic materialism,” which evidences the importance of the dialogic relation among signs in the great network of semiosis, thus of life, of alterity and dialogism as the condition of possibility for the constitution of identity itself, the so-called “entity,” “being.” Maximum expression of “semiotic materialism” in the human world in fact is signifying otherness and the resistance that signifying otherness opposes to identity, that is, closed, monologic, monolithic identity. Identity must effectively recover its very own alterity. But the allusion here is not just to alterity understood as relative alterity, a binary relation among separate entities, where each I remains anchored in ontological being, emerging as a mere alternative with respect to the other, to the other’s being, in which each I, each identity is trapped in the illusion of reassuring monological isolation, without mediations – sign and dialogical mediations.

Instead, identity is called to recover alterity, absolute alterity, non-relative alterity, alterity as excess with respect to the claim to finalised self-consciousness. Thus described identity recognises the elusive, the inaudible, with Emmanuel Levinas the “infinite” at the centre of identity, “the infinite in the finite” – in-finite – detotalised alterity, open, in becoming in the relation mediated-by-signs, in the relation with other open and detotalised alterities, as part of the open-ended flux of semiosis.

With Levinas the relation to the other presupposes otherwise than being,117 a situation of semiotic quality, what Charles Peirce indicates in terms of “qualisign,” “firstness,” “iconicity,” and not being otherwise, a situation of mere alternatives, of the quantitative, numerical order, part of the Peircean sphere of the signsign and legisign.

For Levinas, like Bakhtin, first philosophy is ethics and not metaphysics, which means that life, human life and social organisation, is subverted by the alterity relation, the face-to-face relation among singularities, therefore the condition of responsibility, attention toward the other, caring for the other, the original and governing principle of truth, desire, freedom, in juridical terms of human rights.

From the perspective of an orientation that is not simply alternative, but “altogether otherwise,” we could speak of identity-alterity, of alterity-absence at the heart of identity, of totalisation-detotalisation, of critical realism, semiotic materialism, dialogism or dialogic dialectics, of interpretation-translation, signs in becoming, of infinite semiosis, dynamical, transformational, processual, synecgetic and fractal, of the need to overcome oppositional logic and the violence of conflictual relations, of the dialogic rhythm of relation, of complementarity between interdependency and distinction, between reason and reasonableness; and we could speak of semioethics and its focus on the signifying implications, on the value of ethic, aesthetic and pragmatic experience.

From the perspective of global semiotics practiced as semioethics we have observed how difference is thematised in terms of alterity – that is, absolute alterity – and of dialogism, as alterity-difference, multiplicity-difference. This type of logic achieves unity in diversity on the basis of dialogue

116 Ibid., 147.
and co-participation, even when encounter implies discord. Health, peace, freedom are achieved on the basis of the relation of implication with the other, of unindifferent involvement with the other, of living together, hospitality, solidarity, relations of listening and mutual responsibility, despite the construction of closed identities, barriers and alibis.

Politics and logic share the fact that single unique subjects are reduced to the status of individuals representing a genre, that subjects are considered as equals, interchangeable equals. And yet, on Levinas’s account, both politics and logic originally emerge from the situation of peace and responsibility toward the other, where the I and the other are manifest in their singularity, difference, non-interchangeability, unindifference.

The alterity relation is pre-political and pre-logical. Because of my exclusive responsibility toward every other, this relation compels me to relate to the other under a genre, in other words in the State. As Levinas observes, to know, judge, do justice, confront two individuals in order to establish who is guilty requires generalisation through logic and the State, equality in terms of a genre, an assemblage among singularities insofar as they belong to the same genre, to the same State as its citizens. Therefore the relation with the other becomes a relation mediated by institutions and juridical procedures. This generalises the responsibility of each one, of the singularity – from this generalisation derives the necessity of the State –, but at the same time it also limits responsibility, offering it the possibility of justifications, of alibis. “The work of the State comes to be added, in a manner denying it, to the work of inter-personal responsibility that pertains to the individual in his singularity and that is the work of the individual in his singularity as person in charge [...]”.

If this is how things stand, the Hobbesian conception of homo homini lupus is reversed. The State does not establish, but limits personal responsibility toward the other, while it wants to guarantee it with the generalisation of the law. The primary condition is unconditional, categorical, ethical responsibility for the other; responsibility thus conceived is antecedent to juridical, political responsibility. This type of responsibility is not written, is not inscribed in the law. So then justice administered by the State, with respect to the rights of the other man, to the rights of the other, is always imperfect. From this point of view, “Preoccupation with Human rights is not a state function, rather it is a non-state institution within the State, it is the appeal of humanity as yet unaccomplished in the State.”

The I’s need for security is directly proportional to fear of the other, fear that the I perceives of the other, fear that is not the original condition (Hobbes’s fallacy), but rather is consequent to the constitution of identity. Interpreting Levinas we may claim that the constitution of identity, whether individual or collective, imposes separation from the other, delimitation of identity self-interest in order to determine what belongs to identity and what does not, which is also to determine what regards identity and what does not. Moreover, this means to limit and define one’s own responsibilities toward the other. And to limit responsibility toward the other by appealing to justifications and alibis means to circumscribe one’s fear for the other, that is, fear that we experience for the other, to fear for the other as pre-scribed by the ethical “genitive.”

Difference required by identity for its own fulfillment calls for indifference toward the other, lack of interest in the other, not to have to fear for him; this involves defined, circumscribed responsibility. The trajectory for the constitution of identity passes from unindifference to the other, to difference

118 Levinas, “Entretiens,” in (Poirié 1987), 118.
119 Ibid, 119.
and relative unindifference. This is egocentric identity understood in terms of assertion, confirmation and reconfirmation of the same, belonging, conformism, reproduction of reality, of the world as it is, levelling onto being, allergy caused by the other, phobia toward the other, extomission and elimination of alterity. And the more that which concerns us is reduced to the egoistic self-interest of identity, reduction justified by the constriction, the contraction of responsibility and extension of alibis, the more we get free of fear for the other, but the greater our fear of the other.

Reading Levinas, Augusto Ponzio\(^\text{120}\) as anticipated above, but the concept is important and worth repeating given the human condition in the world today, Augusto Ponzio comments that “fear of the other” commonly resounds in the sense of the fear one experiences of the other, where “of the other” is understood as an object genetive, the other is object of fear, one fears the other. But logical analysis also identifies a subject genetive, wherewith the other is subject of fear, the other is afraid. Instead, another modality of fearing is fear for the other to understand which we must get free of the subject-object dichotomy and experience fear of the other in the sense of the other’s fear, without distinguishing any longer between subject and object. This means to overcome community identity in a relation where the counterpart of difference is no longer indifferrence, but unindifference. In our proposition “of the other” is a sort of ethic genetive which logic should keep account of as the third sense according to which we can disambiguate the condition of experiencing fear of the other.

In his novel Petrolio Pier Paolo Pasolini describes the paroxysmal obsession of identity: “Contrary to appearances, this poem is not the poem of dissociation [...] To the contrary, this poem is the poem of obsession with identity, and, together, of its fragmentation.”\(^\text{121}\)

Given that defence of identity is now at a maximum degree; that dominant logic is the logic of identity, of difference and of indifferece, and responsibility is ever more limited by laws, to the point that so-called “human rights” do not include the “rights of the other”; that in spite of globalisation today social relations are relations among mutually indifferent individuals; it ensues that today’s world is dominated at a maximum degree not by fear for the other, but by egocentric and egoistic fear of the other understood as the subject’s fear of the other, fear experienced by the subject as provoked by that other.

11. Otherwise than the being of things as they are

The European Constitution, formally Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, was signed officially only in 2004, as stated at the beginning of this text, while treaties founding the European Economic Community had already been signed in 1957. Effectively, the European Union was first organised as an economic entity, while unity in cultural life, intellectual thinking, scientific research, fashion, taste, desire, expression, language only came later and with difficulty.

As a new vision of the world the European Union is associated with the constitution of a new identity, identity of the European Community; as compared to national States, the EC should entail a new sense of community belonging. Regarding citizenship, affiliation is to the community itself and through belonging to territory, language, historical, ethnic and religious tradition. However, notwithstanding access to citizenship regardless of origins, history, blood relations, etc., identity in terms of citizenship continues to be achieved in terms of monological closure, of belonging to a closed

\(^{120}\) Ponzio (2006c, 2019).

\(^{121}\) Pasolini (1992), 119, my trans.
community, possession. Moreover, like all “closed communities,” “closed identities,” the EC transforms the other into an “extraidentical,” an “extracommunitarian,” an expression that can even be applied to people belonging to Europe, but whose State does not belong to the European Union.

The logic of identity dominates over the places of argumentation in the official order of discourse. “United in diversity” is a slogan representing the European Union. The same slogan is adopted by the Australian government as a statement of its politics and its current multicultural order. However, in spite of good intentions, the expression “united in diversity” is oriented by identity logic. The European Community, also “united in diversity,” is conceived as a union among States based on accords and conventions. As such it presupposes separate subjects as the terms of the relation, independent, self-sufficient identities, but united by a common history, by common values and traditions.

If, instead, unity is oriented by the logic of alterity, the terms of the relation, including international relations, among States, their citizens, their peoples, are of unindifferent difference, mutual involvement and responsibility/answerability, where responsibility means to respond to the other, for the other, on the other’s account. This is responsibility without alibi, without excuses, without the possibility of evasion.

*Vis-à-vis* the work community, the “extracommunitarian” can aspire to affiliation, to the possibility of residency, even citizenship, but only on the condition of being employed. For a Jew in Nazi Germany an “Arbeitsbescheinung,” employment certificate, meant safety, escape from deportation and internship in a concentration camp. Today, for the extracommunitarian a work permit is a condition for entry into the European Community and prevents expulsion.

In *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Marx observes that “labour is not the source of all wealth” as, instead, is stated in the program, and that “*the bourgeois have very good grounds for falsely ascribing supernatural creative power to labour*.” But already in his 1844 philosophic and economic manuscripts and specifically in “Private property and communism,” Marx criticises “crude and thoughtless communism” (in the official Italian translation “rozzo e volgare comunismo,” that is, “coarse and vulgar communism”) (as well as *ante litteram, ante factum*, “real socialism”). Marx takes a stand against re-planning the social in terms that continue valuing labour in general as the sole source of wealth, so that in “crude and thoughtless communism,” as he defines it, “the category of worker is not done away with, but extended to all men,” just like capitalist society.

To reduce the European community to a work community, therefore society to such an understanding of community is typical of a capitalist conception of the social and of human relations, limited that is to relations among separate single individuals. Given that in the capitalist production system work is merchandise, measured in hours, work which as merchandise produces profit, the “work community” identifies the measure of its own wealth in terms of “work time.” Abstract work, undifferentiated work, work in general which produces value, precisely exchange value, work quantified and paid in hours is a structural component of the capitalist social system. In the language of Nazi Germany, the term “Arbeit,” “labour,” “work,” in addition to meaning “abstract labour,” “undifferentiated labour” also resounds in the interclassist sense, that is, without reference to belonging to a “class,” and to situations of “alienation” and of “exploitation.” Even the duties of a soldier were

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124 Marx (1875).
125 Marx (1844).
indicated with the term “Arbeit,” labour, work. Globalisation, today, the most advanced expression of capitalist, or post-capitalist social reproduction is based on the interclassist idea of “work” and “community.” In other words, alienated work is structural to our globalized world.

That the European Community is a work community is part of the logic of global reality worldwide, dominated by the “ideo-logic” of the market, consumerist ideo-logic, according to a vision of the world centred on the egocentric self-interest of identity, refractory to the other.

In spite of persistance in the actual being of things as willed by dominant ideology and the profound globalization crisis, evidenced by widespread symptoms of malaise not only in the human cultural environment but also in the so-called “natural” environment, a new social organisation can be imagined where the centre of value is not profit, precisely the profit of a few at the expense of many, but instead the quality of human life, of each single individual in one’s singularity.

To the closed, identity community founded on work, we may juxtapose the community as sociality open to alterity, the community free from obsession with egocentric identity, and from the ideo-logic of buying and selling work. Thus understood, sociality is extracomunitarian to itself; a community experienced as intercommunity, transcommunity, conceived in terms of alterity, without borders, without barricades, without affiliations, without roots; sociality founded in singularity, uniqueness, in incommensurable work, where social wealth is measured in terms of disposable time – for one’s own alterity and for the alterity of others.

As Marx claims in Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, the real social wealth is not given by labour time but by disposable time for self and for others. Capitalist production necessarily aims for reduction in labour time, for liberation from work, thanks to progress in technology. This type of development was advocated by Marx as the condition for the wealth, the wellbeing of the single individual as much as of the whole of society. In other words, contrary to dominant ideo-logic commonly associated with capitalist economic development, Marx has real wealth consist in disposable time for self and for the other, therefore, we might add, in the propensity to gift time to the other, to the other of self and to the other from self. This means to elect as a primary value for a healthy society the time of alterity, dialogic alterity, and this implies to privilege the time of gifting to the other, which is also the time of nurturing the other, of caring for the other, listening to the other, hosting the other.

12. Global semiotics, global citizenship

The book Critical Global Semiotics: Understanding Sustainable Transformational Citizenship, edited by Maureen Ellis, deals with a centrally important issue for the health of global humanity today, as is that of citizenship. The political, economic and ethical, or rather, “semioethical” implications of the status of citizenship are particularly complex, involving responsibilities at a planetary level. Global semiotics and semioethics together propose a vision of the world which evidences the central role of dialogic relations among signs and interpretants for continuity in semiosis, therefore life, favouring

126 Grundrisse, written between 1857-58, see Marx (1973).
127 See also Marx (1974).
128 Vaughan (2019).
129 Ellis (2019).
development of processual models that transcend anthropocentric, ethnocentric and glotto-centric boundaries. The connection of signs to values is another major axis in this worldview.

At stake is the future of humanity in Europe and in the world overall, given that the future depends on the decisions we make and the actions we take today. Where there is life there is semiosis and semiosis is in-finite, open-ended, in becoming, evolving out of the dynamics of the relation between interconnectivity and innovation, interdependency and autonomy, intercorporeality and difference, identity and alterity. Semiotics reveals how any organised totality is in fact a detotalised totality, formed from a multiplicity of different smaller totalities, inexorably interrelated and oriented by the dialogic of otherness.

The concept of citizenship calls for reflection in light of new forms of encounter among visions of the world and ways of life, among peoples and cultures. Though we may detect traces thereof in history, in earlier social systems, encounter today occurs in novel forms and together presents new problems that need to be recognised and dealt with. Constitutions, laws and general principles underlying the former require reconsideration in light of innovation and the call for regeneration. An important contribution in this sense can come no doubt from semiotics as the general science of signs and from global semiotics, specified as semioethics with its focus on the relation of signs to values. The conception itself of the European Union can be revisited in this overall framework, keeping account of the role that Europe has always carried out in the history of the world and still does in shaping the world today.

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Bionote: Susan Petrilli, Full Professor of Philosophy and Theory of Languages, University of Bari Aldo Moro, Italy, is 7th Sebeok Fellow of the Semiotic Society of America, Fellow of the International Communicology Institute (ICI), Visiting Professor at University of Adelaide, South Australia. Vice-President of the International Association for Semiotic Studies. As visiting professor she lectures regularly at universities in Australia, China, Brazil, USA, Canada, South Africa, and across Europe. Her publications include: Signifying and Understanding (Mouton De Gruyter, 2009); The Self as a Sign, the World and the Other (Transaction, 2013); Em outro lugar e de outro modo (Pedro&João, 2013); Sign Studies and Semioethics (Mouton De Gruyter, 2014); Victoria Welby and the Science of Signs (Transaction, 2015); The Global World and Its Manifest Faces (Peter Lang, 2016); Dipressioni nella storia. Dal tempo del sogno al tempo della globalizzazione (Mimesis 2017); Challenges to Living Together. Transculturalism, Migration, Exploitation. For a Semioethics of Human Relations (Mimesis International, 2017); Language and Listening, Semioethic Perspectives (Legas 2019); Significare, interpretare e intendere. Tra segni, lingue, linguaggi e valori (Pensa MultiMedia, 2019); with Augusto Ponzo she has co-authored: Lineamenti di semiotica e di filosofia del linguaggio (Guerra, 2016); Dizionario, Enciclopedia, Traduzione. Fra César Cheneau Dumarsais e Umberto Eco (Agal‘Harmattan, 2019); and Identità e alterità. Per una semioetica della comunicazione globale (Mimesis, 2019); for the Mimesis book series “Athanor” she has edited: Semioetica e comunicazione globale (2014), Fedi, credenze e fanaticismo (2016), Pace,
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E-mail: susan.petrilli@gmail.com; Website: www.susanpetrilli.com;
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